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Abstract 
 
This paper considers industry policy and manufacturing in Australia by discussing the levels of tariffs 
and assistance by the Australian state.  Australian policymakers have long been fascinated by the rise 
of East Asia and attempted to emulate a similar high-tech manufacturing industry via neo-liberal de-
regulation.  Such a deregulation was of course was never part of the origin of the East Asian miracle 
until the 1980s.  When it did occur however its effects soon became acutely visible in 1997-1998 
across Asian economies.  The paper does not discuss whether a singular East Asian economic model 
exists.  Nor does it debate the validity of the project apparently contained in the government policy 
since the 1980s.  More to the point, this paper raises the market policy movement that took inspiration 
from fixed perceptions of the East Asian economic miracle which was frequently (but not necessarily 
correctly) identified with neo-liberal deregulation.  In the paper, the exports of elaborately transformed 
manufactures, especially during the Howard Coalition government (1996-2007) period, are analysed.  
What is Australia’s trade performance in such manufactures, including elaborately transformed manu-
factures?  What is the debate on the current support mechanisms?  Most importantly, what has the 
1990s-2000s neo-liberal market governance achieved in Australia?  The paper covers these questions 
and reflects on the nature of Australian manufacturing exports to Japan.  
Introduction 
In Australia, from the 1970s onwards protection of the domestic market and industry assistance came 
to be more intensely debated (Jones 2002: 1-7).  The late 1970s signalled the ‘age of uncertainty’ after 
the ‘age of growth’ (viz. the post-war period) (Wheelwright 1978: 15).  There was too little time for 
the Australian economy to adjust to the structural fallout (of industries) in the 1980s, and the ad hoc, 
inconsistent and conflicting policy-making that has extended into the 2000s (Jones 2000: 60-61).  
With the rise of East Asia’s export-oriented economies, the pressure on the Australian market kept 
building up continuously.  From the late 1980s Australia’s overall share of world exports began de-
clining ever more rapidly, while the East Asian economies were capturing the export markets in the 
developed world (Pinkstone 1992: 377).  Also in the late 1980s Australia began to suffer a decline in 
its share of world foreign investment flows, while Japan’s foreign investment in Asia has continuously 
increased (EIU 1996: 1-35).  This trend of declining foreign investment in Australia continued with 
the growth in the Chinese economy and its flow-on effects to the economies of Hong Kong, Singapore 
and Taiwan.  
East Asian governments selectively began intervening in their tariff-protected domestic markets to 
increase their export share in foreign markets (Rodan et al. 1997: chapters 1 and 2).  For Australian 
studies on the region's industrialisation through government intervention see Higgott and Robison 
(1985) and Robison et al. (1987).  In contrast, in Australia from 1987 onwards the intensification of 
trade liberalisation meant that the mechanisms of support and encouragement (e.g. tax rebates) for 
manufacturing exporters to retool and retrain lost political support as tariff reductions gained in priori-
ty (Capling and Galligan 1992: chapter 1).  Hence, the Australian policy of market governance was the 
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opposite of what was practised in other countries in the region.  The Capling and Galligan (1992) 
study Beyond the Protective State is on a par with the Costa and Duffy (1991) book, Labor, Prosperity 
and the Nineties on having faith in the deregulated market, although neither book predicted where that 
market eventually took Australia.  In particular, the decline of elaborately transformed manufactures 
exports that intensified after the federal election of the first Howard Coalition government is a devel-
opment without precedent. 
The Garnaut Report, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy, argued that tariffs and indus-
try-assistance programs were the most economically debilitating policy mistakes of twentieth-century 
Australia (Garnaut 1989: 211).  However, at the time of the report’s publication, the highly successful 
East Asian markets were well protected in comparison with the Australian market.  Even so, The Gar-
naut Report advocated minimum control on capital flows into and out of the Australian market as the 
way to replicate the Asian market miracle (Garnaut 1989: 103), although it refrained from offering a 
comprehensive policy blue-print to assist export manufacturers.  Financial deregulation required min-
imum control on capital movement, but did not provide a national policy to maintain a competitive 
manufacturing base.  As discussed below, this problem became more acute with the decline in exports 
of elaborately transformed manufactures (ETMs) which are higher value-added exports, after the can-
cellation of industry-assistance programs in 1996.  
Have these post-1996 developments that led to an decline in market intervention led to an increase 
in exports of ETMs?  This is discussed below.  Also presented below are the trade deficit figures for, 
not just for the ETMs, but the entire manufacturing sector.  As shown below, the deficit for the entire 
manufacturing sector has increased in the period 1992-1993 to 2007-2008 while industry assistance 
reduction continued.  The Rudd Labor government formed in late 2007 revised industry assistance 
programs and this is visible in the statistics for 2008-2009 in the below tables.  This paper focuses on 
the 1996-2007 Howard Liberal/National Coalition government. 
Beilharz argues that Garnaut had an image of a type of manufacturing that was ‘less British, more 
Japanese style’.  He adds that ‘the leading role of the Japanese state in its economic miracle [, howev-
er,] simply slipped under the hyperbole.  This has not prevented The Garnaut Report from becoming 
an axiomatic reference point to which both Federal government and opposition genuflect’ (Beilharz 
1994: 142).  Australia’s proximity to the market models in Asia was of no educational benefit to the 
policymakers in Canberra.  Australia’s neo-liberals paid no attention to the early tariff-based manufac-
turing growth in the East Asian economies.   
Beilharz argues the following historical reason for the types of protectionism in Australia: 
 Australian political culture has helped to construct a particular kind of society on the 
basis of social or domestic, and economic or international senses of protection. Start-
ing from the sensibility that the Australian economy and society are small, and there-
fore vulnerable, this kind of argument not only centres on culture but also on power, 
which is always asymmetrical in its distribution … Australian ... institutions of eco-
nomic and social protection ... have ... helped construct a polity and a way of life that 
is relatively advantageous to very many of its citizens, larger as well as smaller. This 
was, after all, the logic of new protection itself, and however flawed its application or 
non-application may have been, we still need to travel with lifeboats (Beilharz 1994: 
211). 
 
The role of ‘support’ by state intervention for certain desired economic outcomes has been shown 
to be part and parcel of market exchange (Barbalet 2001, 1998).  The ‘lifeboats’ analogy is similar to 
the emotional-support mechanisms for local and localised businesses, which ensure that they act in a 
desirable way by creating confidence at sufficient levels for continued inward investment.  If the busi-
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ness community feels reassured and confident that the government will act in a ‘responsible’ way, 
then certain levels of investment activity may eventuate. 
The Pappas Carter Evan Koop Report, The Global Challenge: Australian Manufacturing in the 
1990s (1990), published a year after The Garnaut Report, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascend-
ancy, argues against removing industry protections and tariffs without first installing a comprehensive 
national industry policy.  This is not a blueprint of new style of protectionism, but a defence of state 
intervention informed by the belief that ‘[n]o modern country of significant size has maintained a vital 
economy without a strong industrial base that includes at least some tradeable ETM [elaborately trans-
formed manufacturing] industries’ (AMC 1990: v).  When the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) engaged with the issue of the manufacturing, in Australia Reconstructed, it suggested that the 
government intervene in the labour market to speed up the transfer of skills and workers from declin-
ing industries to those that were expanding (ACTU-TDC 1987: chapters 1 and 2).  For the ACTU, the 
problem is seen mainly in terms of labour market restructuring and re-skilling and not as an issue of 
the broader industrial base of the nation.  The governance of the Australian market after the 1980s  
followed a vision of the industrial base as being free of government intervention, but in reality gov-
ernment continuously finances industry assistance schemes. 
The manufacturing sector contains ‘smart’ jobs with skills that are beneficial to the entire domestic 
market.  Such jobs bring higher amounts of payroll and income tax to the government treasury.  As the 
manufacturing sector declines, so does the related job market.  The end result is a rise in the numbers 
of skilled people who cannot find work to utilise their abilities, and eventually a decline in the number 
of skilled jobs leading to a shortage of trained people down the line (Weller and Webber 2001: 160-
195).  Inevitably, the decline in manufacturing jobs has affected vocational training and skills in the 
labour market in the early 2000s.  Australia began to suffer a shortage of skilled manufacturing people 
‘in the positions of tool-makers, metal fabricators, motor mechanics, electricians, refrigeration me-
chanics and plumbers’, at levels that could threaten ‘to hold back economic growth’ (Maiden 2003: 4).  
Skills training is a form of social spending that creates value in the labour market and which is ap-
propriated by private investors.  Toner argues that MNEs that invest in Australia expect to find a la-
bour market which has been trained by publicly funded vocational education (Toner 2004: 29). How-
ever, public funding of education in Australia has been suffering a decline as a result of neo-
liberalism.  Hence, the lack of skills in the labour market is an outcome of the dominant economic or-
thodoxy.  This is a neo-liberal dilemma.  While neo-liberalism argues that public spending crowds out 
private investment, it actually feeds that investment.  Neo-liberal market governance discourages the 
kinds of productive economic activities that are central to employment and income growth (Grabel 
2002: 39).  Instead it encourages speculative economic activity which leaves fewer funds available for 
the manufacturing sector, which is the sector that creates (high skill) jobs and enhances growth 
(Stiglitz 2002: 101). 
The rise of neo-liberal market policies in Australia has not meant an end to all the industry-
assistance programs.  The small size of the Australian economy which does not allow large economies 
of scale, and dated technology in the manufacturing sector and reduced profits in protected sectors, 
meant that there would be a reorientation towards protection of manufacturing industries in the 1990s 
(Fagan and Webber 1999: 146).  This explains why the Labor governments that preceded the first 
Howard Coalition government were running industry-assistance programs while professing to toe the 
neo-liberal non-intervention line.  From the first Howard Coalition government onwards, however, 
there were reductions in such programs.  The post-war history of industry-assistance schemes defies 
any analysis that seeks a clear pattern (Jones 2000, 2002).  
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Tariffs and trade 
The value of industry assistance in 2008-2009 was approximately A$17.2 billion in gross terms and 
A$9 billion in net terms (Productivity Commission 2010: xii).  This large outlay shows the extent of 
the state’s direct intervention in the market.  ‘Total (gross) tariff assistance’ to industry in 2008-2009 
(see Tariff Schedule 1) was A$9.5 billion. ‘Net Tariff Assistance’ to Australian manufacturing in the 
same period was A$6.5 billion (see Tariff Schedule 2).  The manufacturing sector is the major benefi-
ciary of tariff assistance and the automotive industry is the biggest segment of the manufacturing sec-
tor. 
 
Tariff Schedule 1: Total (Gross) Tariff Assistance to Australian Industry (A$ Billion) 
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
7.6 8.3 8.7 8.5 8.2 9.1 8.3 9.5 
 Data Source: Productivity Commission (2010, 2007). 
 
Tariff Schedule 1 data refers to the entire industrial base of the Australian economy, including 
manufacturing.  Apart from tariff assistance, industry also receives budgetary, pricing and regulatory 
types of assistance.  These are combined under ‘combined assistance’ tables in the Productivity Com-
mission publications. 
 
Tariff Schedule 2: Net Tariff Assistance to Australian Manufacturing (A$ Billion) 
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
4.5 4.9 5.4 5.1 5.2 5.8 5.8 6.5 
Data Source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2010, 2007). 
 
Assistance Schedule 1: Total (Estimated) Budgetary Assistance to Australian Manufacturing (A$ Billion)   
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
2.0 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
Data Source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2010, 2009). 
 
Tariff Schedule 3: Net Tariff Assistance to Australian Auto Industry (A$ Billion) 
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
0.63 0.70 0.80 0.60 0.54 0.63 0.64 1.0 
Data Source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2010, 2007). 
 
Tariff Schedule 2 data refers to the whole of the manufacturing sector, including auto industry.  
Tariff Schedule 1 figures on the other hand are for the entire industrial sector of the Australian econo-
my, which contains the manufacturing sector.  Budgetary assistance to manufacturing is smaller than 
tariff assistance if one compares Tariff Schedule 2 with Assistance Schedule 1 (This data refers to the 
whole of the manufacturing sector, including auto industry).  Tariff protection is the main support 
mechanism for the manufacturing base of Australia.  Net tariff assistance to the auto industry, which is 
discussed below in detail, is governed by the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme. 
Tariff Schedule 3 shows the levels of net tariff assistance to the auto manufacturing sector.  This data 
is only for ‘motor vehicles and parts’ and does not include ‘other transport equipment’ (see Productivi-
ty Commission 2007: 2.4-2.5).  Tariff Schedule 4 shows the 1990-2010 tariff reductions for the auto 
industry in Australia. 
 
Tariff Schedule 4: Auto Industry Tariff Rate Reductions 1990-2010 (%) 
Year Tariff percentage 
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1990 40 
1991 37.5 
1992 35 
1993 32.5 
1994 30 
1995 27.5 
1996 25 
1997 22.5 
1998 20 
1999 17.5 
2000 15 
2005 10 
2010 5 
Data Source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2002a), Department of Innovation, Industry, Science 
and Research (2009). 
 
Assistance Schedule 2: Combined Assistance to Australian Auto Industry (A$ Billion) 
2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 
1.4 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.6 
Data Source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2010, 2009). 
 
Assistance Schedule 3: Rate of Combined Assistance to Australian Auto Industry and Manufacturing (%) 
Year Motor vehicles and parts All manufacturing 
1993-94 38 10 
1994-95 35 9 
1995-96 31 8 
1996-97 28 6 
1997-98 19 5 
1998-99 19 5 
1999-00 19 5 
2000-01 19 5 
2001-02 18 5 
2002-03 16 5 
2003-04 16 5 
2004-05 15 5 
2005-06 13 5 
2006-07 12.1 4.5 
2007-08 12 4.6 
2008-09 11.8 4.6 
Data source: Compiled from Productivity Commission (2010, 2007) and Productivity Commission (1999). 
 
Industry assistance, as defined above, does not solely consist of tariff protection and Assistance 
Schedule 1 shows the levels of budgetary assistance payments to the manufacturing sector.  The offi-
cial definition of ‘combined assistance’ includes budgetary, tariff and agricultural (where applicable) 
pricing and regulatory assistance (Productivity Commission 2007: 2.18).  That means an industry sec-
tor is assisted through direct financing of support schemes plus by tariff protection of the domestic 
market.  Combined assistance levels (which include ‘net tariff assistance’ figures in their calculation) 
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for the auto industry are shown in Assistance Schedule 2.  This figure is only for ‘motor vehicles and 
parts’ and does not include ‘other transport equipment (see Productivity Commission 2007: 2.4-2.5). 
Assistance Schedule 3 shows the ‘effective rates of assistance’ from 1993-1994 onwards the data 
of these years are combined from different publications).  ‘Effective rates of assistance’ refers to ‘as-
sistance to an activity, net of the effects of tariffs and certain other forms of government intervention 
which alter the prices of material inputs used by the industry’ (Productivity Commission 1999: 60). 
This data is presented here in order to provide an approximate indication of the level of reduction in 
the rates of assistance.  As displayed in Assistance Schedule 3 ‘motor vehicles and parts’ receive high-
er rates of assistance than all of manufacturing. 
As a result of phased tariff reductions, ‘the effective rate of assistance’ for the auto industry has 
been falling continuously.  While the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme started in 
2001 as a program of assistance to auto manufacturers, Assistance Schedule 3 shows that the rate of 
assistance has actually been declining since the Scheme’s inception.  Later there is further discussion 
on this topic along with a discussion about the four car manufacturers in Australia.  The paper will 
now consider a particular outcome of the above presented history of tariff and assistance reductions. 
This outcome is the increasing trade deficit that Australia has been having in elaborately transformed 
manufactures.  The volumes of these items that Australia produces and exports are increasingly lower 
that what is imported into the country and the paper will present the related figures below. 
Manufacturing in Australia, even in its present reduced state, contributes more to the economy than 
any other sector (see ABS 8221.0 2006: 8-15).  However, historically the numerous industry policies 
that have been in place have never covered all the sectors that need such assistance packages (Weiss 
1998: 63).  For small-sized manufacturers, for example, the tariff-reduction policies have been a sore 
point for many decades, as cheap imports continue to undercut local prices (Dabrowski 2003: 34).  
Small and medium-sized manufacturers have been allowed to wither.   
The process experienced by Australian industries under neo-liberal governance can be described as 
‘deindustrialisation and long-term structural decline’ (Lucarelli 2003: 99).  Grabel argues that de-
industrialisation is one of the outcomes of neo-liberal market governance, whereby the manufacturing 
sector, unable to yield the rate of profit that other sectors can, does not attract sufficient investment. 
Neo-liberal market governance promotes investment in financial markets rather than in a production-
led economy.  As a result ‘productive activities like manufacturing or infrastructure projects simply 
cannot compete because they rarely offer the opportunity for massive capital gain that is associated 
with speculative projects’ (Grabel 2002: 38).  
The neo-liberal rule of the past three decades, first with the Hawke and Keating governments, and 
then the successive Coalition governments since 1996, has removed many of the industry support 
mechanisms of the previous governments (AMWU 2003b: 36).  One of the exceptions to this has been 
the auto and auto-parts manufacturing industry which, despite the decrease in tariff protection from 
imports, has also been assisted by government spending. As Jones argues, industry policies under 
Howard continued to contain contradictory tendencies (Jones 2000: 60-70).  The obvious example of 
this is the fact that the Automotive Competitiveness and Investment Scheme (ACIS) was funded from 
tariffs on car and car parts imports (Marris 2002: 4).  Tariff duties are used to prop up an industry that 
is under threat of further decline as a result of the continuance of the tariff removal policies.  From 
2010 onwards, the ACIS has been replaced with a new scheme the Global Automotive Transition 
Scheme [GATS] which complements the Green Car Innovation Fund (Review of Australia’s Automo-
tive Industry Final Report 2008: 98).  However this is outside the present discussion.  ACIS shored up, 
in the larger context of tariff reduction policies, the largest manufacturing sector in Australia, one that 
employs thousands and contributes to the nation’s skill, education and technology base. Similar fund-
ing programs have previously existed under different assistance schemes.  However, the sector contin-
ued to decline even after the introduction of the above scheme.   
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MMAL announced in May 2004 that its South Australia engine plant would close, and declared 
that the remaining sole assembly plant may also face the same fate eventually.  The company was tied 
to Daimler Chrysler at the time.  Daimler Chrysler structure dissolved in October 2007.  Daimler 
Chrysler used to own 37 per cent of Mitsubishi in Australia (see The Japan Times 2000: 14).  After 
2001, Mitsubishi Motor Corporation held 100 per cent of issued share capital of Mitsubishi Motors 
Limited Australia.  Under the policy framework of the time, the federal government was planning to 
have reduced auto import tariffs to 10 per cent by January 2005.  So, the company was unwilling to 
wait to see the effects of the tariff reduction.  It scaled down its investment.  Then in March 2008 it 
shut down the remaining manufacturing operation. Hence, the sector continues to shrink.  
Mitsubishi cited the continuing rise in the value of the A$ as one of the reasons for its decision to 
abandon production in Australia (ABC Midday News 2008).  Since the term of the first Howard Coali-
tion government, industry assistance and protection in the Australian market have been argued to be 
insufficient.  This was a point of debate in the months that led to the 2007 federal election. In the peri-
od leading up to the 2007 federal election, the policy platform of Labor included plans for public in-
vestment in the manufacturing sector, in heavy industry high-volume job creation areas such as ship-
building.  The Howard Coalition government of the time called this Labor policy platform industry 
‘protectionist’ which is a reference to the post-World War II period industry policy in Australia. The 
continuing resources boom fuelled by Chinese demand dampened the issue in the period leading to the 
2010 federal election. 
The marginalisation of the Australian manufacturing base forms a long drawn-out trend that is not 
limited to the 1996-2007 Coalition governments.  Inter-party conflicts on tariffs and trade policies 
from the 1950s to the 1970s were replaced by bi-partisan support for neo-liberalism from the 1980s 
onwards among political and bureaucratic elites.  The 1983-1996 Labor governments tried to run neo-
liberalism concurrently with compensatory politics (Beeson and Bell 2000: 312). However the elec-
toral shift away from Labor removed deficit-funded ‘welfare, labour-market and industry policies’ 
(Weiss 1998: 191), and industry-assistance schemes began to be wound down.  This was the Howard 
Coalition period.  The end result has been a decrease in ETM exports.  In the period set out in  Table 
1,  Table 1.1 and  Table 1.2 it is possible to see the effects of the reduction in state intervention (under 
the Howard Coalition government) in the form of industry-assistance spending and tariff protection.  
There is a correlation between government intervention in the market and the manufacture and export 
of ETMs (AMWU 2003b: 36).  
The above statistics for tariff reductions coincide with the deficit figures for elaborately trans-
formed manufactures.  Australia’s manufacture trade [‘total manufactures’] has two components: 
STMs (simply transformed manufactures) and ETMs.  The five year trend (2002-2003 to 2005-2006) 
in ‘total manufactures’ trade between Australia and the rest of the world is an increase of 24 per cent 
in deficit (DFAT 2007: 12).  Within that deficit the ETM deficit is the largest part.  The simple reason 
for this is that ETMs are high-value added products and hence cost more and when there is a trade def-
icit, the fluctuations in the value of A$ can add an extra burden to the economy.  Hence, the ETM 
trade deficit between Australia and the rest of the world has also been increasing.  In the 1995-1996 to 
2001-2002 period, the deficit had increased by 54 per cent (see Table 1).  From 1995-1996 to 2005-
2006 the increase was 125 per cent (see Table 1.1).  From 1995-1996 to 2008-2009 the increase was 
179 per cent (see Table 1.2).  Neo-liberal market policy of the last several decades coincide with a 
consistent increase in ETM exports.  With an increase of 888 per cent the ETM deficit with China is 
the largest. (Here the calculations are made from the 1995-1996 base.  It is also possible to discuss 
these figures on a periodic basis instead of using the same base figure). 
 
 Table 1: Australia’s Deficit in ETM Trade 1995-1996 to 2001-2002 
Market* % Increase 1995-1996 to 2001-2002 % Distribution of deficit 2001-2002  
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World 54 100 
EU 40 29 
Japan 48 21 
USA 2 21 
China 188 15 
Others** 852 14 
 Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002 and 2007). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. 
**The rest of the world combined. 
 
Table 1.1: Australia’s Deficit in ETM Trade 1995-1996 to 2005-2006 
Market* % Increase 1995-1996 to 2005-2006 % Distribution of deficit 2005-2006 
World 125 100 
EU 102 29 
China 500 21 
USA 16 16 
Japan 63 16 
Others** 527 18 
Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002 and 2007). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. 
**The rest of the world combined. 
 
Table 1.2: Australia’s Deficit in ETM Trade 1995-1996 to 2008-2009 
Market* % Increase 1995-1996 to 2008-2009 % Distribution of deficit 2008-2009 
World 179 100 
EU 140 28 
China 888 28 
USA 24 14 
Japan 59 13 
Others** 688 18 
Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002 and 2010b). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. 
**The rest of the world combined. 
 
The fact that ETM manufactures that have been supported by industry-assistance programs have 
higher export potential undermines the neo-liberal argument that non-intervention in the market cre-
ates efficiencies and increases manufacture exports (Sheehan et al. 1994: chapters 1 and 2).  In the pe-
riod from 1995-1996 to 2007-2008 the decline in Australia’s manufacturing trade performance is, in 
many respects, specifically the direct results of the 1996-2007 Howard Coalition governments’ lack of 
comprehensive strategic plan for manufacturing, and their dismantling of much of the industry policy 
mechanisms that existed in the 1990s (AMWU 2003b: 36).  Without such schemes it has not been 
possible to sustain the same level of manufactures. Further, as the auto manufacturers also pointed out 
in 2006 the support mechanisms for the sector did not make up for the shortfall from the tariff reduc-
tion and the rising Australian dollar (Bayari 2008). 
As Barbalet argues from a Keynesian position, ‘it is not market opportunities which determine in-
vestment choice. The business community’s relationship with the political state is a primary source of 
confidence, which informs expectations regarding future returns on current expenditure’ (Barbalet 
1998: 36).  The AMWU submission to the federal government inquiry into Australia’s trade links 
summarised the post-1996  developments in manufacturing policy as follows: 
 
The R&D tax concession has been slashed and investment by manufacturers in R&D 
has fallen … There is no strategy or action plan to attract new greenfield investment 
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in high-value manufacturing, particularly FDI. Not surprisingly, Australia ranks near 
the bottom of OECD countries in attracting such investments … The Export Market 
Development Grants Scheme has been emasculated and is capped at an unrealistic 
level and additional requests for funding … ignored … None of the initiatives to pro-
mote venture capital have resulted in significantly lifting new investment in start-up 
manufacturing firms … But follow-up action has not progressed past ‘Memorandums 
of Understanding’ and Ministerial speeches … Simply put none of the things that 
were required to underpin the 1985-95 manufactures export surge have been done 
(AMWU 2003b: 36). 
 
The Howard Coalition government’s reluctance to continue the previous Labor-style market inter-
ventions, the submission argued, had an obvious detrimental effect, because Australia has not moved 
up into a high-value manufacture exporting type of economy.  This reality is in stark contrast to the 
vision that was offered by The Garnaut Report (1989) that set Australia on the path of neo-liberal de-
regulation. From 1992 to 2006, a period which spans both the Labor and the Coalition governments, 
there is a clear trend of decline for some sectors.  Under the Howard administration net exports made a 
positive contribution to economic growth in just 2 of the last 11 years and that in the last 5 years, de-
spite the resources boom, export volumes have increased by just 2.9 per cent annually (Simon Crean 
Press Release 2007).  What has been declining is the GDP share of manufacturing, while it is the ser-
vice sector that has been on the increase (see Table 2). (The composition of GDP in terms of ‘current 
prices and gross value added’ goes back as far as June 1990, see ABS 5204.0 2004).  
Manufacturing is a sector that is essential for a relatively independent economy.  Yet, when added 
together, the sum total of ‘finance and insurance’, ‘property and business services’ and ‘ownership of 
dwellings’ surpasses the share of ‘manufacturing’ by several-fold.  According to these figures, ETMs 
have formed an ever-diminishing share of overall manufactures, and Australia has suffered increasing-
ly larger trade deficits in ETMs in this period.  As ETMs are produced at home on an ever-decreasing 
scale, imports inevitably rise with demand.  In  Table 2, in the larger context of the national economy, 
the fact is that the largest ‘real industry gross value added average annual growth rate’ is in ‘commu-
nication services’ and ‘finance and insurance’.   This type of growth is frequently referred to as ‘pre-
dominantly consumption-based’ growth (Wade 2004: 17).  That is, the ‘manufacturing growth’ rate 
(including that of ETMs) in the period under consideration was approximately half of the growth rate 
of gross domestic product.   
It should be noted that in the course of the collection of this data in the period under consideration, 
the definitions of full-time employment have undergone changes.  For example, in the 1980s working 
18 hours a week did not count as being in full-time employment but now it does. This may have af-
fected the ABS calculations.  See Carson et al. (1998) for a critique of the calculation and the use of 
the statistics. 
As shown in Table 2 the contribution the manufacturing sector makes to gross domestic product 
has fallen while the shares of mining, finance & insurance, property & business services sectors have 
all increased.  (These figures are for the composition of GDP on an annual basis and are not related to 
the annual growth rates of the components of the GDP).  The decline in the contribution that the man-
ufacturing sector makes to gross domestic product is also accompanied by a decline in manufacturing 
employment, as seen in  Table 3.  Table 3 also shows that here has been a rise in ‘property and busi-
ness services’ and other service sector employment.  The employment levels in ‘agriculture, forestry 
and fishing’, ‘whole trade’ and ‘retail trade’ have all fallen.  
 
 Table 2: The Change in the Composition of Australian GDP (%) 
 Industry 1990 2009 
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Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.1  2.6 
Mining 4.8  7.7 
Manufacturing 14.5  9.4 
Electricity, gas and water supply 3.5  2.5 
Construction 7.1  7.4 
Wholesale trade 5.9  4.9 
Retail trade 5.8  4.7 
Accommodation, cafes and restaurants 1.9  2.5 
Transport and storage 5.9  5.8 
Communication services 2.6  3.4 
Finance and insurance 5.5  10.8 
Property and business services 9.9  11.8 
Government 4.3  5.3 
Education 4.6  4.3 
Health and community services 5.7  6.1 
Cultural and recreational services 1.7  0.9 
Personal and other services 2.0  2.0 
Ownership of dwellings 9.3  8.0 
TOTAL 100 100 
Data Source: Compiled from ABS 5204.0 (2010). 
 
 Table 3: Labour Market Share of Industrial Sectors (%) 
Industry 1990 2009 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 5.5 3.3 
Mining 1.1 1.6 
Manufacturing 14.4 9.1 
Electricity, Gas and Water Supply 1.3 1.2 
Construction 6.9 9.0 
Wholesale Trade 6.4 4.0 
Retail Trade 14.1 10.8 
Accommodation, Cafes and Restaurants 4.6 6.8 
Transport and Storage 4.9 5.1 
Communication Services 1.8 1.9 
Finance and Insurance 4.4 3.7 
Property and Business Services 8.0 12.9 
Government  4.4 6.2 
Education 6.8 7.6 
Health and Community Services 9.2 11.0 
Cultural and Recreational Services 2.2 1.8 
Personal and Other Services 3.7 4.1 
TOTAL 100 100 
Data Source: Compiled from ABS 6202.0 (1986-2003), ABS 6291.0 (2010). 
ETM trade with Japan and trade volumes 
Economic relations with Japan have been covered previously elsewhere (Bayari 2011, 2010, 2008). 
The following brief discussion highlights the decline of trade volumes in ETMs in trade with Japan. 
Australia’s deficit in ETM trade with Japan increased 59 per cent from 1995-1996 to 2008-2009 (see 
Table 1.2).  Therefore it appears that there is a trend of increasing deficit. It may be that Australia is 
not in a position to respond to demand from Japan.  It is also clear that Australia’s total ETM exports 
are declining, as discussed above.  When the total export and import figures are considered the picture 
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of the bilateral trade is one of decline. In 1991-1992 Japan bought 26.5 per cent of Australian exports 
but the figure was 19.3 per cent in 2008-2009 (see  Table 4).  
In the same time frame, Japan’s share of Australia’s imports also fell from 18.2 per cent to 7.3 per 
cent of the total (see Table 5).  This indicates a declining trend in trade relations between the two na-
tions.  Japan’s resource import needs have been in decline as its manufacturing sector has moved into 
a higher value-added and more energy-efficient phase. Japan’s share of overall Australian exports has 
been declining (see Table 4).  Overall, Japan is still the biggest market of Australian exports and Aus-
tralia is the third biggest market of Japanese exports.  In 2008-2009 Japanese ETM exports to Austral-
ia was worth 15,024 A$ million and Australian ETM exports to Japan was worth $A454 million 
(DFAT 2010b: 43, 76). 
 
 Table 4: Australia’s Export Volumes to Japan (A$ million) 
Year $m Japan’s rank as export market % of total exports 
1991-1992 14,574 1 26.5 
2005-2006 31,075 1 20.4 
2008-2009 55,005 1 19.3 
Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002, 2006, 2009). 
 
An increasingly smaller percentage of Australia’s imports have been coming from Japan with the 
rise of other export-oriented economies in Asia (see Table 5).  The share of Australian exports that go 
to Japan has also shrunk (Table 4), although Australia’s export items have not changed in the last two 
decades (Table 5.2). 
 
 Table 5: Australia’s Import Volumes from Japan (A$ million) 
Year $m Japan’s rank as import source % of total imports 
1991-1992 9,290 2 18.2 
2005-2006 17,334 3 10.3 
2008-2009 20,315 3 7.3 
Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002 , 2006, 2009). 
 
 Table 6: Australia’s Trade Deficit in Manufactured Products 1991-1992 to 2001-2002 
Market* % Increase 1991-1992 to 2001-2002 % Distribution of Deficit in 2001-2002 
World 122 100 
EU 133 33 
USA 59 22 
Japan 73 20 
China 447 25 
Others** 271 10 
Data Source: Compiled from DFAT (2002). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. **The rest of 
the world combined. 
 
Despite the fact that a higher proportion of Australia’s exports go to Japan than the proportion of 
our imports from Japan, there may eventually develop a net trade deficit with Japan (currently such a 
deficit exists only in manufactured items traded with Japan).  There is a structural imbalance in the 
nature of the bilateral relationship despite Australia’s surplus, because of the high value-added nature 
of Australia’s imports from Japan, and the low value-added quality of its exports.  This has intensified 
with Japan’s continuous upward movement into higher value-added exports and Australia’s continu-
ous reliance on primary exports.  Japan increasingly needs less of what Australia exports and Australia 
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exports increasingly less of what Japan needs to import.  Rix identified this trend towards the declin-
ing importance of Australia’s resources for the Japanese economy in the 1980s, well before the height 
of the deregulatory market policies (Rix 1984: 95).  The extent to which Australia’s deficit with Japan 
rose is small compared with the extent of the rise in the deficit with China.  This may be an indication 
of the increase of cheaper Chinese imports.  
 
 Table 6.1: Australia's Trade Deficit in Manufactured Products1991-1992 to 2005-06 
Market* % Increase 1991-1992 to 2005-06 % Distribution of Deficit in 2005-2006 
World 228 100 
EU 226 33 
China 1065 22 
USA 85 20 
Japan 89 25 
Others** 718 10 
Data source: Compiled from DFAT (2007). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. **The rest of 
the world combined. 
 
Table 6.2: Australia's Trade Deficit in Manufactured Products1991-1992 to 2008-09 
Market* % Increase 1991-1992 to 2008-09 % Distribution of Deficit in 2008-2009 
World 312 100 
EU 303 30 
China 1800 27 
USA 250 26 
Japan 162 16 
Others** (171) 1 
Data source: Compiled from DFAT (2010b). *In the order of the percentage distribution of deficit. **The rest of 
the world combined. 
 
Table 6.2 shows the latest situation of Australia in comparison with Japan, the EU and the others.  
These figures are for the entire manufacturing sector whereas the above ETM figures were for a sec-
tion (albeit the largest section in net A$ terms) of the manufacturing industry.  That is, The term 
‘manufactured products’ means all that the nation manufactures as tradable merchandise which as a 
category contains two types of merchandise: 1-simply transformed manufactures, 2-elaborately trans-
formed manufactures.  The latter is discussed above in detail in terms of the trade deficit Australia has 
with the rest of the world in general and Japan in particular.  In the last decade there were large rises in 
the trade deficits in manufactures with all of Australia’s trading partners.  The largest increase is in 
trade with China.  However, the largest deficits overall were with the EU trading bloc, followed by 
China, USA and Japan.  Table 6.2 shows that in the longer time frame of 1991-1992 to 2008-2009, the 
manufactured products trade deficit that Australia has with the rest of the world is larger than the defi-
cit in the period from 1991-1992 to 2001-2002.  Australia remains a net manufactures importer.  
Moreover, China appears to be enjoying an increasing trade surplus of manufactured products in their 
trade with Australia. 
This paper has queried whether neo-liberal market governance has increased Australia’s manufac-
turing exports.  In the light of these trade deficit figures, it is clear that Australia is not reaching its 
goal of becoming a high value-added commodities exporting nation, as was hoped by the neo-liberal 
blueprint of The Garnaut Report, Australia and the Northeast Asian Ascendancy (1989).  In trade with 
Japan too, Australia is either standing still or, in the case of ETM exports, rolling backwards.  The 
multilateral trade liberalisation promoted in Australia was supposedly a response to the ‘commodity 
dependence’ on food and ore export up until the 1980s, a dependence Australia tried to overcome by 
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attempting market and product diversification and expansion (Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade References Committee 2000: 88-110).  However the results of this ‘promotion’ process so far do 
not appear to be encouraging from the point of view of the Australian market which, instead, has been 
suffering trade deficits.  There is a need to investigate this development as part of a wider assessment 
of government policy on the Australian market to establish whether the current state of market per-
formance (and hence the trade deficit in manufactures) is transitory or more in the nature of the capi-
talist market that performs at a less than optimum level when government assistance is insufficient.  
 
NOTES: 
1-A$ value calculations are based on current prices (i.e. not inflation adjusted). 
2-A$ values are for financial years (1 July-30 June). 
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